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THE GERMAN BANKING SYSTEM -
SYSTEM OF THE FUTURE?
Theodor Baums* and Michael Gruson**
I. INTRODUCTION
In early 1991 the United States Treasury Department of the
Bush Administration recommended in its proposal for "Modern-
izing The Financial System"1 that, in addition to other remarka-
ble breaks with the traditional United States financial services
framework, the current bank holding company structure be re-
placed with a new financial services holding company that would
reward banks with the ability to engage in a broad new range of
financial activities through separate affiliates, including full-ser-
vice securities, insurance, and mutual fund activities.2 The Trea-
sury Department pointed out that commercial banking and in-
vestment banking are complementary services and that the
Glass-Steagall separation was unnecessary 3 The Treasury De-
partment gave many reasons for the need for financial moderni-
zation and why such a modernized system would work better. As
an example that demonstrates the advantages of the system pro-
posed by the Treasury Department, the proposal pointed to the
German banks and called the German model of a universal
banking system the most liberal banking system in the world.4
What makes the German universal banking system so unique
and desirable? The following outline of the history and the cur-
rent structure of the German banking system is intended to give
readers a background to determine whether the German banking
system could be a model for the system of the future.
* Dr. jur., Professor at the University of Osnabrick, Germany.
** M.C.L. (1963), LL.B. (1965), Columbia University, Dr. jur. (1966), Freie Univer-
siVit, Berlin; Partner, Shearman & Sterling, Member of the New York Bar. The authors
acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Roger Miller and Roland F. Ftirst.
1. U.S. TREAs. DEP'T, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYsTEMs: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SAFER, MORE CoPETuIvE BANKS 54-61 (1991) [hereinafter Treasury Dep't Recommen-
dations]. The Treasury Department Recommendations provide an analysis of the devel-
opment of the United States financial services industry. Id. at XVIII-1 to XVIII-38.
2. Id. at XVIII.
3. Id. at XVIII-13. But see Don More, Note, The Virtues of Glass-Steagall: An Ar-
gument Against Legislative Repeal, 1991 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 433 [hereinafter More,
Note].
4. Treasury Dep't Recommendations, supra note 1, at XVIII-29.
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN BANKING SYSTEM
The roots of the present universal banking system in Ger-
many can be found in the late eighteenth century and the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century when the banking business was
run largely by private bankers like Bethmann, Rothschild, and
Bleichr6der.5 These private bankers were engaged in the deposit
and credit business and underwrote securities of sovereign issu-
ers.' Banks in the legal form of corporations were formed in the
middle of the nineteenth century and operated from the begin-
ning as universal banks.' Although the banking crisis of 1931
and the years after 1945 were critical times for the German
banks, the universal banking system gurvived. Unlike the United
States, Germany did not enact a Glass-Steagall Act 8 in response
to the banking crisis of 1931. The United States' influence after
the Second World War led only to the creation of a central bank
system comparable to the Federal Reserve System, but, other
than in Japan, the United States did not insist on a separation
of commercial banking from investment banking.9
After the Second World War, the Western Allied Powers
closed the German central bank, the Reichsbank, which had
been established in the year 1876, and created eleven state cen-
tral banks (Landeszentralbanken) - one central bank for each
state. In 1948, as a first step towards a new federal central bank,
the Bank of the German States (Bank deutscher Ldnder) was
created as a central bank for the state central banks for the 'oc-
cupation zones of the United States, France, and Great Brit-
5. BANKIERS SIND AUCH MENSCHEN, 225 JAHRE BANKHAUS GEBRODER BETHMANN (V.
Bethmann ed.). See Bankgeschichte in BANK-LEXIKON 291-315 (Karlheinz Milssing et al.
eds., 10th ed. 1988) [hereinafter BANK-LEXIKON]; Hans Pohl, Das deutsche Bankwesen
(1806-1848), in 2 DEUTSCHE BANKENGESCHICHTE 18-42 (1982) [hereinafter H. Pohl, Das
Deutsche Bankwesen (1806-1848)]; Michael Hoeflich, Historical Perspectives on Sover-
eign Lending, in SOVEREIGN LENDING: MANAGING LEGAL RISKS 21-27 (Michael Gruson &
Ralph Reisner eds., 1984).
6. H. Pohl, Das deutsche Bahkwesen (1806-1848), supra note 5, at 21, 23-26.
7. H. Pohl, Das deutsche Bankwesen (1806-1848), supra note 5, at 119-23; Manfred
Pohl, Die Entwicklung des deutschen Bankwesens zwischen 1848 und 1870, in 2
DEUTSCHE BANKENGESCHICHTE 171-73 (1982).
8. The Glass-Steagall Act is set forth in various sections of the Banking Act of 1933;
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 278 & 377 (1988).
9. See the discussion of the Dodge Plan for the reorganization of the German bank-
ing system which proposed a separation of commercial banks and investment banks in
Manfred Pohl, Die Entwicklung des privaten Bankwesens nach 1945, in 3 DEUTSCHE
BANKENGESCHICHTE 225-26 (1983) [hereinafter M. Pohl, Entwicklung].
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ain.10 Finally, in 1957 the Bank of the German States and the
state central banks were replaced by the German Federal Bank
(Deutsche Bundesbank). The German Federal Bank is the Ger-
man central bank and a bank of issue, and its main functions are
to guarantee the stability of the monetary system, to regulate
the circulation of money, and to safeguard the supply of credits
for the economy. The German Federal Bank has its central ad-
ministration in Frankfurt. It has nine main offices, which are
still called state central banks (Landeszentralbanken). These
state central banks are not separate entities, as they had been
before 1957, but branches of the German Federal Bank.
Parallel to this development, a process of dissolution and
re-creation of the former three large commercial banks took
place. After the Second World War, the Western Allied Powers
dissolved the three large banking corporations - Deutsche
Bank AG, Dresdner Bank AG, and Commerzbank AG - and
permitted the creation of thirty successor banking institutions.
In 1952 the thirty banking institutions were recombined into
three successor institutions for each of the former three large
banks, and in 1957 the former Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank,
and Commerzbank were reconstituted."
III. BANKING IN GERMANY TODAY
The banking industry in Germany is composed of a variety
of public and private credit institutions. Although the kinds of
activities permitted to each category of credit institutions are
not limited, certain distinctions in the typical range of customers
or transactions still exist. The different credit institutions are:
(1) the private sector commercial banks (private Geschffts-
banken); (2) the savings banks (Sparkassen) and their central
institutions (Landesbanken und Girozentralen);2 and, (3) the
industrial and agricultural credit co-operatives (Volksbanken
and Raiffeisenbanken), their regional institutions (Genossen-
schaftliche Zentralbanken), and their central institution
(Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank) .13
The savings banks, which formerly had their focal point in
10. Id. at 226-31.
11. For details, see id. at 231-41.
12. Since the activities of the savings banks are governed by state law, their permit-
ted scope of activities might slightly vary from state to state. All are, however, universal
banks.
13. See M. Pohl, Entwicklung, supra note 9, at 259-73.
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savings deposits and long-term loans, are now also engaged in
the short-term deposit and credit markets, and their central in-
stitutions - the regional Landesbanken - are active in large-
scale lending, industrial financing, and the securities business. In
addition, the central institutions provide a clearing system and a
variety of other banking services for their associated savings
banks. At the same time, the commercial banks have penetrated
the savings deposit business formerly dominated by the savings
banks. Substantially all savings banks in Germany are organized
under public law by municipalities, counties, or associations of
municipalities, and the Landesbanken are also established
under public law and owned either by the states, the savings
banks of the states, associations of the savings banks, or a com-
bination thereof.14
At the end of September 1992 there were 337 commercial
banks in Germany, with total assets of DM 1,508 billion. Of
these banks, 198 were widely held commercial banks, 57 were
subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks, and 82 were closely
held commercial banks. In addition, there were 724 savings
banks organized under public law by municipal, regional, or
state authorities, and 13 central institutions (Landesbanken).
Germany's banking system also includes 2,963 industrial and ag-
ricultural credit cooperatives, and allied institutions and their
four central institutions.15 All of these institutions are universal
banks.
Besides these universal banking institutions, there are also
specialized credit institutions such as mortgage banks, ship
mortgage banks, building and loan associations, and investment
14. For a detailed discussion of several Landesbanken, in particular of the liability
of the states and municipalities for the obligations of the Landesbanken, see Registra-
tion Statement of SUdwestdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale (Securities and Exchange
Commission Registration Statement No. 33-56342, filed December 24, 1992); Offering
Circular of Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale, New York'Branch, dated December 4,
1992, relating to $250,000,000 7-/s % Subordinated Notes Due December 14, 2002 (Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency Registration Statement); Prospectus of
Landeskreditbank Baden-Wtirttemberg dated February 1, 1993 under Prospectus Sup-
plement dated February 1, 1993 relating to $300,000,000 7-% % Subordinated Notes Due
2023, at 46, 47 (Securities and Exchange Commission Registration Statement No. 33-
46771) [hereinafter Landeskreditbank Baden-Wfirttemberg Prospectus].
As to the history of the savings bank and Landesbanken, see Gfnter Ashauer,
Entwicklung der Sparkassenorganisation ab 1924, in 3 DEUTSCHE BANKENGESCHICHTE
279-83 (1983).
15. Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Nov. 1992, table III, 13 [hereinaf-
ter Monthly Report]. See Landeskreditbank Baden-Wilrttemberg Prospectus, supra note
14, at 65.
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companies under the Investment Companies Act. These institu-
tions need a license under the Kreditwesengesetz (KWG) and,
in addition, must comply with the provisions of the special laws
governing their activities. Mortgage banks (Hypothekenbanken),
organized either under public law (Grundkreditanstalten) or
under the general corporate law, are specialized in, and also lim-
ited by law to, activities like long-term lending to private build-
ing owners and public authorities.16 They finance their lending
mostly through the issuance of mortgage-backed bonds17 and
public debt-backed bonds,18 but they also issue short-term and
medium-term bank bonds. Of the 35 mortgage banks in exis-
tence at the end of September 1992, seven were mortgage banks
organized under public law with total assets of DM 37,642 mil-
lion.19 The building and loan associations (Bausparkassen) -
the most rapidly expanding institutions in post-war Germany
due to the housing needs of the population - accept deposits
from customers to build up a basis for future loans to these cus-
tomers under specific conditions and only for the purpose of
housing. In addition, at the end of September 1992 there were
eighteen credit institutions with special purposes.
IV. ELEMENTS OF THE GERMAN UNIVERSAL BANKING SYSTEM
A. Permitted Activities
The universal banking system in Germany allows banks to
16. M. Pohl, Entwicklung, supra note 9, at 250-53.
17. Pfandbriefe, or mortgage-backed bonds, are generally long-term bonds (with an
original maturity of four years or longer), the principal and interest of which are at all
times secured by a pool of specified mortgage loans listed in a register maintained by the
credit institution. The pool is replenished as required to keep the mortgage-backed
bonds fully secured. Mortgage-backed bonds may be issued in registered or bearer form.
See Hypothekenbankgesetz (Mortgage Bank Law) § 6, 1990 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1.] I
2898, (F.R.G.); Gesetz Ober die Pfandbriefe und verwandte Schuldverschreibungen 6ffen-
tlich-rechtlicher Kreditanstalten (Law Relating to Mortgage-backed Bonds of Public
Sector Banks) § 2, 1963 BGBl. 1 312, (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Gesetz iiber die Pfandbriefe].
18. Kommunalobligationen, or public debt-backed bonds, are generally long-term
bonds (with an original maturity of four years or longer), the principal and interest of
which are at all times secured by a pool of specified loans listed in a register maintained
by the credit institution and made by the credit institution to German public authorities
or entities organized under public law or to certain European Community entities, or
guaranteed or otherwise secured by such authorities or entities. The pool is replenished
as required to keep the public debt-backed bonds fully secured. Public debt-backed
bonds may be issued in registered or bearer form. See Gesetz Ober die Pfandbriefe,
supra note 17, § 8.
19. See Monthly Report, supra note 15.
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offer a variety of financial services to their customers, such as
the taking of deposits, consumer and commercial lending, securi-
ties underwriting and trading, mutual fund operations, and in-
vestment advising. Section 1(1) of the German Banking Law, the
KWG, enumerates certain activities and provides that any en-
terprise engaging in one or more of such activities on a scale that
requires a commercially organized business operation is a bank-
ing institution (Kreditinstitut) and is subject to the licensing re-
quirements and other provisions of the KWG.2 0 (The following
text refers to licensed banking institutions as "banks.") Thus,
the purpose of Section 1 of the KWG is not to enumerate activi-
ties that are permissible to banks, but to establish the require-
ment of a banking license for certain activities. The enumeration
of Section 1 of the KWG does not include certain activities fre-
quently carried on by banks, and licensed banks may engage in
activities not enumerated in Section 1. The commencement and
termination of activities not enumerated in Section 1 must, how-
ever, be reported to the Federal Banking Supervisory Authority
20. Gesetz fiber das Kreditwesen [KWG] § 1, 1961 BGB1. I 881 (F.R.G.) [hereinaf-
ter KWG]. Most recently amended by the Gesetz zur Anderung des Gesetzes fiber das
Kreditwesen und anderer Vorschriften fiber Kreditinstitute (Law for the Change of the
Banking Law and of Other Provisions Relating to Banks) 1992 BGBl. I 2211-28 (F.R.G.)
[hereinafter KWG, 1993 Amendments]. Banking activities are defined as:
1. The acceptance of monies from others as deposits, irrespective of whether or not in-
terest is paid thereon (deposit business);
2. The granting of money loans and acceptance credits (lending business);
3. The purchase of drafts and checks (discount business);
4. The purchase and sale of securities for the account of others (securities business);
5. The custody and administration of securities for the account of others (safe custody
business);
6. The transactions, specified in Section 1 of the Investment Companies Act (Gesetz fiber
Kapitalanlagegesellschaften, infra note 23) (investment business);
7. The incurring of the obligation to acquire claims in respect to loans prior to their
maturity;
8. The issuance of guarantees and other warranties on behalf of others (guarantee busi-
ness); and
9. The performance of cashless payment and clearing operations (giro business).
The Federal Minister of Finance, after consultation with the Deutsche Bundesbank
[hereinafter German Federal Bank], may by regulation designate further activities as
banking activities if, in the accepted view of the business community, this is justified
having regard to the regulatory purposes of the KWG. KWG, § 1.
For English language translation of the KWG, see MARTIN PELTZER & JERMYN P.
BROOKS, GERMAN BANKING LAW - GESETZ UBER DAs KREDITWESEN 6 (3d ed. 1990); HAN-
NES SCHNEIDER ET AL., THE GERMAN BANKING SYSTEM - DAs BANKWESEN IN DEUTSCHLAND
(4th ed. 1986); Deutsche Bundesbank Special Series, No. 2, BANKING ACT OF THE FED-
ERAL RPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1986); Rudolf Panawitz & Harald Jung,
KREDrrWESENGESETz-BANKING ACT, GERMAN-ENGLISH COMMENTARY (1988).
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(Supervisory Authority) (Bundesaufsichtsamt fi~r das Kredit-
wesen).21 Some non-enumerated activities are customary to
banks, such as underwriting, factoring, forfeiting, financial leas-
ing, dealing in precious metals and collectors' coins, and dealing
in foreign exchange. Banks not only may engage in securities
brokerage business, but also may act as real estate brokers.22
German banking law does not differentiate between commercial
banks and investment banks and has no equivalent to the Glass-
Steagall Act.
There are, however, some limitations on the activities in
which a bank may engage. Banks may not engage in investment
business as defined in Section 1 of the Investment Companies
Act.23 Banks also may not engage in the insurance business,
which means they may not issue insurance policies. Insurance
companies require a license from the Federal Insurance Supervi-
sory Office (Bundesaufsichtsamt fir das Versicherungswesen)
to conduct insurance business, and such licenses will not be
granted to banks.24 However, banks may act as brokers for the
sale of insurance policies issued by licensed insurance compa-
nies. 25 As will be discussed below, banks may also own insurance
companies. 26 It follows from the above discussion that the ap-
proach of the KWG differs radically from the approach of the
United States bank regulations: In Germany a variety of activi-
ties require a banking license, but a licensed bank is not re-
stricted from engaging in other activities. In the United States,
however, essentially only one activity - the combination of
lending and deposit-taking - requires a banking license, and a
licensed bank is limited to a rather narrow range of activities. In
Germany, once an enterprise has been licensed as a bank, it may
expand its activities, whereas in the United States, an enterprise
licensed as a bank must refrain from all activities other than
21. KWG, supra note 20, § 24(1) No. 9. See Ekkehard Bauer, Regulation in Ger-
many, in REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS - UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL, § 13.07 at
13-12 to 13-13 (Michael Gruson & Ralph Reisner eds., 1991) [hereinafter Bauer, Regula-
tion in Germany].
22. Bauer, Regulation in Germany, supra note 21, § 13.07, at 13-12 to 13-13.
23. Bauer, Regulation in Germany, supra note 21, § 13.07, at 13-11. On the other
hand, investment companies must have a banking license. Gesetz iber
Kapitalanlagegesellschaften (Investment Companies Act) § 2(1), 1970 BGB1. I 127, as
amended (F.R.G.); KWG, supra note 20, § 1(1), sentence 2, No.6.
24. Bauer, Regulation in Germany, supra note 21, § 13.07, at 13-12 to 13-13.
25. Bauer, Regulation in Germany, supra note 21, § 13.07, at 13-13.
26. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
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narrowly defined banking activities. The United States regula-
tions do not cover a large number and variety of financial insti-
tutions that compete with banks in the financial services market,
but they do severely restrict and, some observers say, overregu-
late the few financial institutions that they do cover. Many ob-
servers feel that non-bank financial institutions enjoy a substan-
tial competitive advantage. The German banking license, on the
other hand, must be understood as a license required to provide
any financial service.
B. Permitted Investments
A German bank may invest in other banks, as well as in
commercial, industrial, and insurance companies. The only limi-
tation is that the aggregate book value of the investments of a
bank (exceeding 10% of the capital of the target companies) in
stockholdings and other assets deemed to be illiquid must not
exceed the liable capital of the bank.2 7 The 1993 Amendments to
27. The KWG, 1993 Amendments provide that investments by a bank in real estate,
buildings, operating and business equipment, ships and shares in banks and other enter-
prises, as well as in rights resulting from capital contributions as silent partner (stiller
Gesellschafter), from participation rights (Genussrechte), and from loans pursuant to
Section 10(5a) of the KWG to other banks [subordinated loans], may not, in the aggre-
gate, measured by book value, exceed the liable capital of the bank. KWG, 1993 Amend-
ments, supra note 20, § 12(1). Investments in shares of a company are disregarded for
this computation if they do not exceed 10% of the capital of such company. In addition,
investments in certain securities of a company held in the bank's trading account that do
not exceed 5% of the capital of such company are also disregarded for such computation.
KWG, supra note 20, § 12(2) Nos. 1 & 2.
Certain investments in banks and financial institutions (other than investment com-
panies) are not subject to the limitation of Section 12(1) of the KWG, i.e., these invest-
ments are deducted from liable capital and are not added to the sum of investments that
may not exceed the liable capital: (i)(x) each investment in a bank or financial institu-
tion if such investment exceeds 10% of the capital of such bank or financial institution,
and (y) subordinated loans to, rights under participation rights (Genussrechte) in, and
preferred shares of, banks and financial institutions if the investor bank has an invest-
ment in the target bank or financial institution exceeding 10% of the capital of such
bank or financial institution and (ii) the aggregate amount of (x) each investment in a
bank or financial institutions up to and including 10% of the capital of such bank or
financial institution, and (y) subordinated loans to, rights under participation rights in,
and preferred shares of, banks and financial institutions if the investor bank has no in-
vestment in the target bank or financial institution or only an investment of up to and
including 10% of the capital of such bank or financial institution, provided that the
amount of (ii) is deducted from liable capital and disregarded for purposes of Section
12(1) of the KWG in the version of the 1993 Amendments only to the extent it exceeds
10% of the liable capital of the investor bank. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20,
§ 12(1) (referring to KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 10(6a), sentence 1, Nos.
4 & 5).
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the KWG,28 which transform the Second Banking Directive of
the EEC29 into German law, also provide that a bank's "signifi-
cant investment" (investment of at least 10%) in an enterprise
(other than a bank, a financial institution, an insurance com-
pany, or a company providing supporting services to the bank)
may not exceed 15% of the liable capital of such bank, and all
such significant investments of a bank in the aggregate may not
exceed 60% of the liable capital of such bank.30 A bank may
A "financial institution" is an enterprise that is not a bank within the meaning of
Section 1 of the KWG but which is principally engaged in investing in other companies,
purchasing receivables, leasing, issuance or administration of credit cards or travelers
checks, dealing for its own account or for the account of customers in foreign currencies,
dealing for its own account in securities, dealing for its own account or for the account of
customers in forward contracts, options, and other hedging instruments relating to cur-
rencies and interest rates, underwriting of securities, consulting on and providing of ser-
vices in connection with the capital structure, industrial strategies and M&A of enter-
prises, arranging of loans among banks (money brokerage services), managing of
securities portfolios and providing investment advice. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra
note 20, § 1(3). See Michael Gruson & Wolfgang Feuring, The New Banking Law of the
European Economic Community, 25 IN'L LAW. 1, 14 (1991) [hereinafter Gruson &
Feuring].
28. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20.
29. Second Council Directive 89/646 of 15 December 1989 on the Coordination of
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit
of the Business of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780, 1989 O.J. (L 386)
1 [hereinafter Second Banking Directive]. See generally Gruson & Feuring, supra note
27; Michael Gruson & Werner Nikowitz, The Second Banking Directive of the European
Economic Community and Its Importance for Non-EEC Banks, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
205 (1989); Michael Gruson & Werner Nikowitz, The Reciprocity Requirement of the
Second Banking Directive of the European Economic Community Revisited, 12 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 452 (1989); Uwe H. Schneider, Die Harmonisierung des Bankrechts in
der Europiiischen Gemeinschaft, 39 Osterreichisches BankArchiv, Zeitschrift fr das
Gesamte Bank-und B6rsenwesen 312 (1991); Uwe H. Schneider, The Harmonization of
EC Banking Laws: The Euro-Passport To Profitability and International Competitive-
ness of Financial Institutions, 22 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 261 (1991); Udo-Olaf Bader,
Regulation by the European Communities, in REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS - UNrrED
STATES AND INTERNATIONAL (Michael Gruson & Ralph Reisner eds., 1991).
30. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 12(5). See Second Banking Direc-
tive, supra note 29, arts. 12(1) & 12(2); Gruson & Feuring, supra note 27, at 10. The
limitations of Section 12(5) of the KWG only apply to banks that are engaged in taking
deposits from the public and providing credit.
"Significant investment" (bedeutende Beteiligung) is defined in the KWG, 1993
Amendments, as (i) a direct or indirect investment in at least 10% of the capital or the
voting rights of a target company or (ii) the possibility of the exercise of a significant
influence over the management of the enterprise in which an investment has been made.
KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 1(9). See Second Banking Directive, supra
note 20, art. 1(10); Gruson & Feuring, supra note 27, at 10.
Investments by a bank in other enterprises are not subject to the restrictions of
section 12(5) of the KWG if such investments are not intended to serve the business of
the bank through creation of a long-term connection to the target company. Cf. Handels-
gesetzbuch (German Commercial Code) [HGB] § 271(1) (using the same concept); for an
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exceed the 15% and 60% limitation on investments if it covers
the significant investments in excess of these limits by liable
capital and does not include that portion of its liable capital in
the calculation of its capital ratios.321
Investments (significant or otherwise) in banks, financial in-
stitutions, and insurance companies are not subject to the 15%
and 60% capital limitation.2 Apparently, the legislature is of
the opinion that because investments in banks, financial institu-
tions, and insurance companies are subject to regulation, they do
not carry the same risk as investments in unregulated commer-
cial and industrial enterprises.3 3 In addition, any investments in
excess of 10% of the capital of target banks and financial insti-
tutions are not subject to the limitation that all investments of
an investor bank may not exceed the investor bank's liable capi-
tal, and such investments of 10% or less are not subject to such
limitations only if they exceed in the aggregate 10% of the liable
capital of the investor bank. 4 The reason for disregarding these
example, see Financial Statements, Landeskreditbank Baden-Wilrttemberg Prospectus,
supra note 14, at Supp. nn. 9 & 12. This permission of short-term investments outside
the restrictions of Section 12(5) of the KWG would cover investments in connection with
debt previously contracted or underwritings. See Second Banking Directive, supra note
29, art. 12(4); Gruson & Feuring, supra note 27, at 10. As to companies providing sup-
porting services to a bank, see Gruson & Feuring, supra note 27, at 52.
The exclusion from Section 12(5) of the KWG of such non-permanent investments
reflects the provision of Art. 12(4), Sentence 2 of the Second Banking Directive, which
provides that the investment limitations of Article 12(1) and (2) of the Second Banking
Directive do not apply to shares that do not constitute financial fixed assets in accor-
dance with Article 35(2) of the Council Directive 86/635 of 8 December 1986 on the
Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts of Banks and Other Financial Institutions,
1986 O.J. (L 372) 1.
31. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 12(5). Section 12 (5) refers to the
ratios to be computed pursuant to the regulations of the Supervisory Authority promul-
gated or to be promulgated pursuant to KWG, supra note 20, §§ 10(1), sentence 2 &
10a(1), sentence 1. See Gruson & Feuring, supra note 27, at 11.
32. See KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 12(5).
33. The Second Banking Directive, supra note 29, saw a risk in participation by
banks in other companies because such participation may affect the soundness of the
bank if the subsidiary runs into financial difficulties (contagion risk) and because such
participation constitutes a long-term freeze on the assets of the investing bank, but the
Directive excluded credit institutions (banks) and financial institutions from the restric-
tion on participation. See Proposal for a Second Council Directive, COM(87)715 final at
II 3 (b) (explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal for the Second Banking
Directive). See also Gruson & Feuring, supra note 27, at 10; Michael Gruson, Investment
in Foreign Equity Securities and Debt-Equity Conversion by U.S. Banks, Bank Holding
Companies, and Foreign Bank Holding Companies, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 441.
34. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 10(6a), sentence 1, Nos. 4 & 5 &
§ 12(1). See also supra note 27. Note that a significant investment is an investment of at
least 10%, i.e., the term includes investments of 10%. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra
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investments in banks and financial institutions from the liable
capital limitation is that these investments are deducted from
the capital of the investor bank for purposes-of computing its
liable capital.3 5 Non-significant (10% or less) investments in tar-
get banks and financial institutions that amount in the aggre-
gate to 10% or less of the liable capital of the investor bank are
subject to the overall restriction that all investments of a bank
may not exceed the bank's liable capital.3 6 All investments in
insurance companies are subject to the limitation that all invest-
ments of a bank may not exceed the bank's liable capital.
There are also limitations regarding large credits (Gross-
kredite) - credits to a single borrower or group of borrowers -
that restrict a bank's investments.3 7 Credits to a single customer
that exceed 15% of the liable capital of a bank are "large cred-
its" and must be promptly reported to the German Federal
Bank. All disbursed large credits in the aggregate may not ex-
ceed eight times the liable capital of the bank, and no single
large credit may exceed 50% of the liable capital of a bank.38
The KWG defines "credits" to include the holding of shares or
other participation by a bank in a borrower's enterprise if it
amounts to at least one-fourth of the capital of such enterprise.3
note 20, § 1(9). The treatment of investments in banks and credit institutions for pur-
poses of the computation of liable capital and for purposes of the rule that all invest-
ments of an investor bank may not exceed such bank's liable capital depends on whether
the target banks' investment is more than 10%, i.e., investments of 10% are not in-
cluded. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 10(6a).
35. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 10(6a), sentence 1, nos. 4 & 5.
36. See supra note 27. These investments are not deducted from the capital of the
investor bank for purposes of computing its liable capital. KWG, 1993 Amendments,
supra note 20, § 10(6a), sentence 1, No. 5.
37. KWG, supra note 20, § 13. See Council Directive 91/121 of 21 December 1992
on Monitoring and Controlling Large Exposures of Credit Institutions, 1993 O.J. (L 29)
1, and Commission Recommendations 87/62 on Monitoring and Controlling Large Expo-
sures of Credit Institutions, 1987 O.J. (L 33) 10; Gruson & Feuring, supra note 27, at 33-
35.
38. KWG, supra note 20, §§ 13(1), 13(3) & 13(4). KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra
note 20, § 13(8) contains special rules as to the computation of liable capital for pur-
poses of section 13 of the KWG. Essentially, the definition of liable capital of section
13(8) deletes most additions to the liable capital added by the 1993 Amendments and
thus applies a narrower concept of liable capital. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note
20, § 13(8).
39. The KWG defines "credits" for purposes of section 13 of the KWG as including
equity investments by a bank in a borrower's enterprise, if the investment amounts to at
least one quarter of the capital (nominal capital or number of shares) of such enterprise,
regardless of the duration of such holding. KWG, supra note 20, § 19(1).
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The duration of the investment is irrelevant. 0
C. Permitted Shareholders
As far as the ownership of a bank is concerned, German
banking law, prior to the 1993 Amendments to the KWG, did
not limit such ownership to certain kinds of investors or to cer-
tain percentages, nor did it require reports about the owners.41
Industrial and commercial companies could own banks, and in
some cases the authorities, and even the bank itself, did not
know the owners. The 1993 Amendments incorporate the rules
of the Second Banking Directive on shareholdings in credit insti-
tutions,42 and the new Section 2(b) of the KWG provides that a
person who intends to make a significant investment (10% or
more) 43 in a bank must promptly inform the Supervisory Au-
thority and the German Federal Bank. The notice must contain
information demonstrating the reliability of the investor and its
officers. The owner of a significant investment must also report
to the Supervisory Authority and the German Federal Bank a
proposed increase of a significant investment that would result
in the investment reaching or passing the threshold of 20%,
33%, or 50% of voting rights or capital of the bank, or would
result in the bank becoming such investor's subsidiary.44 The
Supervisory Authority can deny the investment within three
months if it is not satisfied with the reliability of the investor or
its officers, 45 or if an effective supervision of the bank is not pos-
sible because of the investment or the relationship of the inves-
40. KWG, supra note 20, § 19(1).
41. For the situation in the United States, see Eric B. Fischman, Expanding Bank
Ownership: A Necessity For the Financial Stability, Economic Efficiency and Global
Competitiveness of the U.S. Banking Industry, 11 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 509 (1992); E.
GERALD CORRIGAN, FINANCIAL MARKEr STRucTuRE: A LONGER ViEw in FED. RESERVE
BANK ANN. REP. at 6, 39 (1987); Treasury Dep't Recommendations, supra note 1, at
XVIII-22 to XVIII-23.
42. Second Banking Directive, supra note 29, arts. 5 & 11. See Gruson & Feuring,
supra note 27, at 11-13.
43. See supra note 30 (discussion of significant investments).
44. The KWG, 1993 Amendments define "subsidiary" as an enterprise that is a sub-
sidiary in the meaning of HGB, supra note 30, § 290. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra
note 20, § 1(7). Section 290 of the Handelsgesetzbuch defines the subsidiary of a parent
as a company in which the parent has the majority of votes, or as to which the parent
has the right to elect or dismiss the majority of the members of the administrative or
supervisory board or as to which the parent has the right to exercise a controlling influ-
ence on the basis of an agreement with the subsidiary (Beherrschungsvertrag) or on the
basis of a provision in the charter of the subsidiary. HGB, supra note 30, § 290(2).
45. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, §§ 2b(1) & 33(1), sentence 1, No. 2a.
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tor with other enterprises. 46 Likewise, any shareholder owning a
significant investment in a bank who intends to dispose of that
investment, or to reduce it below the benchmarks of 20%, 33%,
or 50% measured by voting rights or capital, or to reduce the
investment below the subsidiary level must inform the Supervi-
sory Authority and the German Federal Bank.47 The 1993
Amendments to the KWG make certain that the owner of a sig-
nificant investment in a bank will be known to the German
banking authorities; it does not change the principle that indus-
trial and commercial companies may invest in or own banks.
D. Summary
The foregoing discussion indicates that the German univer-
sal banking system is characterized by three aspects:
(1) Universal banking means that a bank may offer all kinds
of financial services, including securities services, to its
customers;
(2) Universal banking means that a bank may be related to
non-banking corporations in that a bank may own equity inter-
ests in, or otherwise control, other enterprises in the financial
sector as well as in commercial or industrial enterprises; and,
(3) Universal banking means that a bank may be related to
non-banking corporations in that non-financial enterprises may
invest in, own all of the equity of, or otherwise control a bank
provided the regulator considers the investor to be reliable.
These three aspects of the universal banking system must
be clearly distinguished from each other, although this is not al-
ways done. A legal development that liberalizes restrictions in
one area (i.e., the kind of services permitted to be performed by
46. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 33(1), sentence 2. This Section pro-
vides that approval of an investment may be denied if: (i) the bank and the investor who
owns a significant investment in the bank are "connected" (verbunden) in the meaning
of the Aktiengesetz [Corporation Law] § 15, 1965 BGB1. I 1089, as amended (F.R.G.),
and (ii) because of this connection between the investor and the bank or because of the
structure of connections between the owner of the significant investment and other en-
terprises an effective supervision of the bank is not possible. A connection in the mean-
ing of § 15 of the Aktiengesetz is created if a company owns a majority of the shares or
voting rights of another company, if a company has the possibility to exercise a domi-
nant position over another company, if a dominant enterprise and one or more depen-
dent enterprises are managed together by the dominant enterprise (Konzern), or if each
of two companies own more than 25% of the shares of the other company. The Supervi-
sory Authority alsq has the power to deny the owner of a significant investment the
exercise of his voting rights. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 2b(2).
47. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 2b(4).
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a bank) does not necessarily have an influence on the other
areas.
V. THE REGULATION OF BANKS IN GERMANY
A. Applicable Laws
Banks in Germany are subject to extensive supervision and
regulation comparable in many respects to the supervision of
United States commercial banks. Laws on banking are enacted
by the German Federal legislature (Bun.destag), and the states
only retain the right to enact laws concerning their own state
banks and savings banks established under state law and their
central institutions (Landesbanken).48 These state statutes may
impose additional regulatory requirements and operational limi-
tations on the state banks. The most important federal banking
laws are the KWG,49 the Investment Companies Act,50 and the
Securities Deposit Act.51 The KWG, as last amended on January
1, 1993, transformed into German law the Second Banking Di-
rective5 2 and the Council Directive of 17 April 1989 on Own
Funds of Credit Institutions. 3 In 1985 the KWG had been
48. Banking law is subject to the legislative jurisdiction of the states only as long as
and to the extent the Federal legislature has not acted in this area. GRUNDGESETZ [Con-
stitution] [GG] arts. 72 & 74, No. 11 (F.R.G.). See MIcHAEL GRUSON, DIE BEDORFNIS-
KOMPETENZ 29 (1967). For state laws, see e.g., the Baden-Wiirttemberg law regulating
savings banks and creating and regulating Sildwestdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale,
Sparkassengesetz of Baden-Wfirttemberg, 1992 Baden-Wiirttemberg Gesetzblatt [Official
State Gazette, hereinafter BW GBI] 128, and the Baden-Wfirttemberg law creating and
regulating a specialized state bank, Gesetz Ober die Landeskreditbank Baden-Wtirttem-
berg 1972 BW GBl. 129, as amended (F.R.G.).
49. See supra note 20.
50. See Gesetz fiber Kapitalanlagegesellschaften, supra note 23.
51. Gesetz Ober die Verwahrung und Anschaffung von Wertpapieren (Depotgesetz)
[Securities Deposit Act] 1937 Reichsgesetzblatt [Official Gazette, hereinafter "RGBI."]
171, as amended (F.R.G.).
The industrial and agricultural credit cooperatives are governed by the Gesetz be-
treffend die Erwerbs-und Wirtschaftsgenossenschaften [Business and Trade Coopera-
tives Act] 1889 RGB1. 55 in 1898 RGB1. 369, 810, as amended, and the Deutsche Genos-
senschaftsbank is incorporated on the basis of the Gesetz Ober die Deutsche
Genossenscbaftsbank [Act on the Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank] 1975 BGB1. I 3171
(F.R.G.).
Laws dealing with specialized banks are Gesetz dber Bausparkassen [Act on Build-
ing and Loan Associations] 1991 BGB1. 1 454 (F.R.G.); Hypothekenbankgesetz [Mortgage
Bank Act] 1990 BGB1. I 2898 (F.R.G.); Gesetz Uiber Schiffspfandbriefbanken (Schiff-
sbankgesetz) [Ship Mortgage Bank Act] 1963 BGBI. I 302, as amended (F.R.G.).
52. See supra note 29.
53. Own Funds Directive, Council Directive 89/299, 1989 O.J. (L 124) 16 [hereinaf-
ter Own Funds Directive]. The Council Directive of 18 December 1989 on a Solvency
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amended to take into consideration the recommendations on su-
pervision on a consolidated basis of the Basle Committee on
Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices,54 and to add the
principle of consolidation for the reporting of banking groups,
the monitoring of their capital basis, and the limiting of their
large loans.""
B. Regulation of Entry
The first step required in order to start a banking business
in Germany is to receive a banking license from the Supervisory
Authority. 6 An adequate liable capital, a business and organiza-
tion plan, and at least two managers having the professional
qualifications necessary to manage a bank are required as a pre-
condition to obtaining a banking license. 7 A banking license is
necessary as soon as one of the activities listed in section 1 of
the KWG58 is conducted on a commercial basis. Once a license is
issued, the bank is entitled to open branches in all parts of Ger-
many and abroad.5 9 The license requirement also applies to
branches of foreign banks from countries outside the European
Economic Community (EEC), where each branch needs its own
license.6 0 The 1993 Amendments to the KWG implement the
Ratio for Credit Institutions, 89/647, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 14 [hereinafter Solvency Ratio
Directive], will be transformed by regulation of the Supervisory Authority promulgated
pursuant to Section 10(1) of the KWG. See Gruson & Feuring, supra note 27, at 28-33.
54. Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, Report on
the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments. The original 1975 Concordat, re-
leased to the public in March 1981, is reproduced in International Monetary Fund, In-
ternational Capital Markets: Recent Developments and Short-Term Prospects, 1981,
OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 7, Aug. 1981, at 29-32. It was revised in Committee on Banking
Regulations and Supervisory Practices, Revised Basle Concordat on Principles for the
Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments, May 1983. The Concordat was further
supplemented in April 1990, Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Information
Flows Between Banking Supervisory Authorities, April 1990 and Supplement to the
Concordat, April 1990.
55. See KWG, supra note 20, §§ 10a, 12a & 13a.
56. KWG, supra note 20, § 32. See Bauer, Regulation in Germany, supra note 21,
§ 13.09, at 13-15 to 13-16.
57. KWG, supra note 20, §§ 32 & 33. See Bauer, Regulation in Germany, supra
note 21, § 13.09, at 13-15.
58. See supra note 20.
59. See Bauer, Regulation in Germany, supra note 21, § 13.09 at 13-16. Openings
and closings of branches must only be reported to the Supervisory Authority. Bauer,
Regulation in Germany, supra note 21, § 13.10, at 13-16.
60. See Bauer, Regulation in Germany, supra note 21, § 13.10, at 13-16 to 13-17.
The First Council Directive of 12 December 1977 on the Coordination of Laws, Regula-
tions and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Busi-
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"European passport" concept of the Second Banking Directive
and provide that credit institutions authorized in another EEC
member state (Member State) are entitled to offer their services
freely to individuals and businesses in Germany and to establish
branches in Germany without the need for any further
authorization.6 '
C. Capital Adequacy and Liquidity
In order to protect the integrity of the German banking sys-
tem, the KWG and the regulations of the Supervisory Authority
thereunder impose certain requirements with respect to the cap-
ital adequacy and liquidity of banks. These rules on capital ade-
quacy and liquidity, which predate the Basle Agreement on Cap-
ital Standards, 2 may be viewed as the core of German banking
regulation.
In order to be able to meet their obligations to their credi-
tors, banks must maintain adequate liable capital. The term "li-
able capital" (haftendes Eigenkapital) is defined in section 10
of the KWG, which has been amended by the 1993 Amendments
to incorporate the rules of the Own Funds Directive."3 Section
ness of Credit Institutions, 77/780, art. 9(1), 1977 O.J. (L 322) 30, requires that member
states do not grant more favorable treatment to branches of non-EEC credit institutions
than that accorded to EEC credit institutions. See Gruson & Feuring, supra note 27,
at 3.
61. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 53b. See Second Banking Directive,
supra note 29, arts. 6(1) & 18(1). See also Gruson & Feuring, supra note 27, at 3-7.
An EEC credit institution may directly or through branches engage in Germany in
the activities enumerated in § 1, Sentence 2, Nos. 1 to 5 and 7 to 9 of the KWG (exclud-
ing No. 6, the transactions specified in Section 1 of the Investment Companies Act). The
1993 Amendments to the KWG take the position that the activities listed in § 1 of the
KWG are identical with, or at least not more narrow than, the activities listed in the
Annex to the Second Banking Directive because the Annex defines the scope of the prin-
ciple of mutual recognition of the banking licenses of other EEC member states: each
member state must ensure that at least the activities listed in the Annex may be pursued
in its territory by any credit institutions authorized and supervised by its EEC home
member state. See Gruson & Feuring, supra note 27, at 4.
62. The Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, Inter-
national Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, 30 I.L.M. 978
(June 1988) [hereinafter Basle Agreement]. For further discussion of the Basle Agree-
ment, see Joseph J. Norton, The Work of the Basle Supervisors Comm. on Bank Capital
Adequacy and the July 1988 Report on Int'l Convergence of Capital Meas. and Capital
Standards, 23 INT'L LAW. 245 (1989); Duncan E. Afford, Basle Committee International
Capital Adequacy Standards: Analysis and Implications for the Banking Industry, 10
DICK. J. INT'L L. 189 (1992); Camille M. Caesar, Capital-Based Regulation and U.S.
Banking Reform, 101 YALE L.J. 1525 (1992).
63. See supra note 53.
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10 lists the items that liable capital may comprise. These items
include: (1) the different types of equity capital, depending on
the legal form of organization of the bank;6 4 (2) net profit to the
extent such profit is allocated to the capital or retained earnings
reserves of the bank;6 5 (3) certain reserves and provisions, sub-
ject to limitations66 (including, subject to limitations, a certain
percentage of non-realized reserves based on the difference be-
tween book value and real value of real estate and securities67 );
(4) preferred stock;68 (5) contributions of silent partners (stille
Gesellschafter) meeting certain requirements; 69 (6) subordi-
nated debt meeting certain requirements; 0 and, (7) capital paid
in against issue of participation rights (Genussrechte) meeting
certain requirements."1
Section 10 of the KWG in the 1993 Amendments further
requires that specific items which do not serve as loss or insol-
vency protection be deducted from liable capital. These items
include: (1) losses; 2 (2) certain intangible assets'3 (which include
goodwill, certain formation expenses, licenses, trademarks, and
similar rights); (3) certain holdings in other credit institutions or
financial institutions exceeding 10% of such other institutions'
capital;74 and, (4) certain holdings in other credit institutions or
financial institutions of up to 10% of such other institutions'
capital to the extent such investments exceed in the aggregate
10% of the liable capital of the investor bank.7 5
Liable capital not only serves as a cushion to withstand bus-
iness losses, but is also used as a benchmark to limit the volume
of a bank's activities. The aggregate book value of illiquid assets
may not exceed the bank's liable capital.76 The liable capital
64. KWG, supra note 20, § 10(2).
65. KWG, supra note 20, § 10(3).
66. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, §§ 10(4a), (4b) & (4c).
67. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, §§ 10(3) & 10(4a).
68. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 10(4a).
69. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 10(4).
70. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 10(5a).
71. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 10(5).
72. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 10(6a).
73. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 10(6a).
74. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 10(6a). See supra note 27 for a dis-
cussion of this section.
75. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 10(6a). See supra note 27 for a dis-
cussion of this section. For a discussion of liable capital under the Second Banking Di-
rective, which calls liable capital "own funds", Gruson & Feuring, supra note 27, at 31-
33.
76. KWG, supra note 20, § 12. For a discussion of section 12, see supra text accom-
1993]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. [Vol. XIX:1
limits the permissible amount of a single large loan by the bank
as well as the sum of a bank's large loans." Three conditions
must be met as of the close of each business day: (1) the differ-
ence between a bank's assets and liabilities (as specified) denom-
inated in foreign currency or precious metals may not exceed
21% of a bank's liable capital; (2) certain specified interest risks
arising from interest rate futures and interest rate options may
not exceed 14% of a bank's liable capital; and, (3) risks deter-
mined by the sum of the difference between delivery claims and
delivery obligations arising under forward and option contracts
involving price risks other than interest rate risks - provided
that these contracts do not hedge the price risk posed by a port-
folio of instruments of the same type - may not exceed 7% of a
bank's liable capital.78 These ratios of risk positions are known
as Principle Ia (Grundsatz Ia). Because the 1993 Amendments
to the KWG expanded the definition of liable capital in compli-
ance with the Own Funds Directive, 9 the percentage figures
have been reduced recently to the following: for (1) from 30% to
21%; for (2) from 20% to 14%; and, for (3) from 10% to 7%. 8O
panying notes 27-36.
77. KWG, supra note 20, § 13. For a discussion of section 13, see supra text accom-
panying notes 36-40.
78. Grundsitze iber das Eigenkapital und die Liquiditzt der Kreditinstitute -
Bekanntmachung Nr. 1/69 des Bundesaufsichtsamts for das Kreditwesen [Announce-
ment Concerning the Principles on Capital and Liquidity of Banks] 1969 Bundesanzeiger
[Official Gazette, hereinafter BAnz no. 17] as amended in 1974 and 1983, (F.R.G.), [here-
inafter Bekanntmachung No. 1/69]. See Bauer, Regulation in Germany, supra note 21,
§ 13.15, at 13-23.
Principle Ia was promulgated after the failure of Bankhaus Herstatt in 1974 to limit
the risks of banks from open positions in foreign currency and precious metals. It has
been revised to extend the scope beyond such positions to include risk positions arising
from derivative products.
79. See supra note 53. See also supra text accompanying notes 64-75.
80. The Supervisory Authority has promulgated an amendment to Bekanntmachung
No. 1/69, supra note 78, to reduce the percentage figures as indicated in the text. Banz
No. 44 of Dec. 31, 1992. Bekanntmachung tiber die Anderung und Erglinzung der
Grundsitze tber das Eigenkapital und die LiquiditAt der Kreditinstitute (Release to
amend Bekanntmachung No. 1/69) [hereinafter Amendment to Bekanntmachung No. 1/
69].
See Memorandum of the Bundesaufsichtsamt fUr das Kreditwesen, Erilluterungen
zur Bekanntmachung fiber die Anderung und Ergiinzung der Grundsatze tiber das
Eigenkapital und die Liquiditdit der Kreditinstitute (Explanations relating to the Re-
lease to amend Bekanntmachung No. 1/69) 1992, at 33 [hereinafter Explanations]. A
cover letter of the Supervisory Authority to the Amendment to Bekanntmachung No. 1/
69 and to the Explanations, dated Dec. 29, 1992 (No. I 7-4216-1/91), stated that banks
for the first time on June 30, 1993 must report on compliance with the new Principle I,
see infra notes 84-87, and revised Principle Ia.
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Banks must invest their funds in such a way that adequate
solvency is assured at all times."' The aggregate amount of long-
term loans - loans having an original term of four or more
years - and investments must not exceed the aggregate amount
of a bank's capital, long-term liabilities - liabilities having an
original term of four or more years - and specified percentages
of certain other liabilities. This requirement is known as Princi-
ple II (Grundsatz I1).12 The aggregate amount of a bank's short-
term and medium-term loans and investments must not exceed
the aggregate amount of its short-term and medium-term liabili-
ties and specified percentages of certain other liabilities. This re-
quirement is known as Principle III (Grundsatz III).83
The concept that liable capital is the basis for the volume of
a bank's activities is an old concept of German bank regulation.
Until December 31, 1992, Principle I (Grundsatz I) required
that the aggregate amount of all of a bank's risk assets must not
exceed eighteen times its liable capital."4 As said above, the 1993
Amendments to the KWG transformed into German law the
Own Funds Directive and its definition of liable capital or - as
the Directive calls it - the own funds. In 1993 the corollary to
the Own Funds Directive, the Solvency Ratio Directive 5 of the
EC, and its concept of risk-based capital adequacy, which is
based on the relationship between a bank's capital and the
banking risk, has been transformed into German law by way of
regulation of the Supervisory Authority promulgated under sec-
tion 10 of the KWG.88 This regulation creates a new Principle I
which requires a solvency ratio of liable capital to risk-adjusted
assets and certain off-balance-sheet items of at least 8%. The
solvency ratio is computed according to the following formula:
liable funds
Solvency ratio = risk-adjusted assets and off-balance-
sheet items
The existing rule which requires that assets of a bank do not
exceed eighteen times its liable capital has been superseded.8
81. KWG, supra note 20, § 11.
82. Bekanntmachung No. 1/69, supra note 78.
83. Bekanntmachung No. 1/69, supra note 78.
84. Bekanntmachung No. 1/69, supra note 78.
85. See supra note 53.
86. See Amendment to Bekanntmachung No. 1/69, supra note 79.
87. Amendment to Bekanntmachung No. 1/69, supra note 79. See Gruson & Feur-
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Furthermore, the sum of most reserves and provisions that
may be added to liable capital,88 capital paid against issue of
participation rights (Genussrechte),89 and subordinated debt 0
may not exceed the amount of core capital (Kernkapital) 1 Sub-
ordinated debt may not exceed 50% of core capital.2
D. Reserve Requirements
Based on section 16 of the Bundesbank Act,93 the German
Federal Bank may require banks to hold a specific percentage of
their liabilities arising from deposits or from short- and me-
dium-term borrowing in non-interest-bearing accounts with the
German Federal Bank. Within certain limits, the German Fed-
eral Bank may set the percentages at different levels. The Mini-
mum Reserves Order94 issued by the German Federal Bank sets
out the details of the reserve requirements, the kinds of liabili-
ties for which minimum reserves must be maintained, and the
balances to be held in the accounts. The minimum reserve sys-
tem is intended to give the German Federal Bank a flexible and
effective instrument of liquidity policy. 5 All banks in Germany
are, in principle, obliged to maintain minimum reserves. To en-
sure compliance with the minimum reserves regulation, banks
subject to reserve requirements are monitored by the state
branches of the German Federal Bank and the accuracy of their
reserve reports is checked by inspectors of the German Federal
Bank.96
ing, supra note 27, at 28-31.
88. See supra note 66.
89. See supra note 71.
90. See supra note 70.
91. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 10(6b). Core capital is defined in
KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 10(4a), and consists essentially of paid-in
capital, retained earnings, and certain reserves, less losses and certain intangible assets.
92. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 10(6b). See also Gruson & Feuring,
supra note 27, at 32.
93. Gesetz Uber die Deutsche Bundesbank 1957 BGB1. I 745 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter
Bundesbank Act], as amended most recently by the Vierte Gesetz zur Anderung des
Bundesbankgesetzes (Fourth Law amending the Bundesbank Act) 1992 BGBI. I 1287
(F.R.G.).
94. Anweisung der Deutschen Bundesbank fiber Mindestreserven (AMR) 1983
BAnz. Nos. 21 and 27, as amended (F.R.G.).
95. See Bundesbank Act, supra note 93, § 16.
96. See Bauer, Regulation in Germany, supra note 21, § 13.22, at 13-30 to 13-32.
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E. Deposit Protection
Finally, it must be mentioned that Germany has no govern-
ment-organized deposit insurance system. Nevertheless, the
banking industry has organized its own private deposit protec-
tion funds. Private sector commercial banks, credit institutions
organized under public law, and credit co-operative institutions
each have their own system of deposit protection. The private
commercial banks participate nearly without exceptions in a
fund that covers all liabilities to creditors up to 30% of the lia-
ble capital.9 7 For public law credit institutions, the deposit pro-
tection system is organized as a mutual system consisting of
twelve regional funds for the mutual financial assistance of the
savings banks on a regional basis (Sparkassenstiftzungsfonds)
and a separate fund (Sicherungsreserve) for the mutual assis-
tance of all Landesbanken. These thirteen funds are interrelated
so that if any one fund has exhausted its resources, the other
funds will be used to make up any deficiency. Although volun-
tary, participation in these funds is favorable for banks because
non-participants must inform their non-bank customers accord-
ingly. 8 Virtually all deposit-taking banks belong to one of the
deposit protection funds set up by the banking associations.99
VI. THE SUPERVISION OF BANKS IN GERMANY
The original KWG of 1934 subjected banks to the supervi-
sion of a newly established supervisory authority at the Reichs-
bank. °00 In the early years of the Federal Republic of Germany
the supervision of banking was in the hands of the German
states, but in 1962 the supervisory authority over banks finally
was given to the Supervisory Authority. °10 The Supervisory Au-
thority must carry out the bank supervision in close cooperation
with the German Federal Bank, which is the German central
97. See BANK-LExIKON, supra note 5, at 686.
98. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 23a.
99. For a discussion of the German deposit insurance system, see FEDERATION BAN-
CAIRE DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DEPOSIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES OF THE COMMER-
CIAL BANKS IN MAJOR COUNTRIES (Brussels 1991). For a background on EEC initiatives
relating to deposit insurance, see Recommendation Concerning the Introduction of De-
posit Guaranties Schemes, 87/63, 1987 O.J. (L 33) 16, and Gruson & Feuring, supra note
27, at 36-37.
100. See generally Kreditwesengesetz of 1934, § 30 (1934).
101. Bundesaufsichtsamt ffir das Kreditwesen, established by the Kreditwesengesetz
of 1962. See KWG, supra note 20, §§ 5-9.
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bank.1 2 The Supervisory Authority is an independent federal
agency reporting to the Ministry of Finance. 10 3 The functions of
the Supervisory Authority and the German Federal Bank are
clearly divided: The authority to issue administrative acts bind-
ing on banks is vested only in the Supervisory Authority,
whereas the German Federal Bank has no enforcement power in
the field of bank regulation and bank supervision.104 The Super-
visory Authority, however, must consult with the German Fed-
eral Bank before it issues general regulations, and if the regula-
tions affect the functions of the German Federal Bank (such as
in the case of regulations concerning capital and liquidity), the
consent of the German Federal Bank is required.105 Further-
more, the German Federal Bank is charged with collecting and
analyzing the periodic reports of the banks."0 8 Each institution
informs the other of all observations and findings that may be of
relevance for the performance of their respective functions. 0 7
All banks in Germany must file with the Supervisory Au-
thority and/or with the German Federal Bank immediate notice
of certain events and certain monthly, quarterly, and annual re-
ports. The details of the reporting requirements are set forth in
several regulations. 0 8 For instance, the reports cover the follow-
ing: information about organizational changes; 09 the extension
of large loans;110 the extension of certain credits to the bank's
directors, officers, and employees;"' the acquisition or
102. KWG, supra note 20, § 7. The Deutsche Bundesbank was established as Ger-
many's central bank and bank of issue in 1957 by the Bundesbank Act. See supra note
93.
103. KWG, supra note 20, § 5; see Bauer, Regulation in Germany, supra note 21,
§ 13.05, at 13-8.
104. See Bauer, Regulation in Germany, supra note 21, § 13.05, at 13-9.
105. KWG, supra note 20, § 1(1) (consultation) & § 10(1) (consent). See Bauer,
Regulation in Germany, supra note 21, § 13.05, at 13-10.
106. Bauer, Regulation in Germany, supra note 21, § 13.05, at 13-10.
107. KWG, supra note 20, § 7(1). Bauer, Regulation in Germany, supra note 21,§ 13.05, at 13.10.
108. See, e.g., Verordnung fiber die Anzeigen und die Vorlage von Unterlagen nach
dem Gesetz fiber das Kreditwesen, 1985 BGBI. I 1716 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Reporting
Regulation]; Verordnung fiber die Befreiung von bestimmten Pflichten nach dem Gesetz
fiber das Kreditwesen, 1985 BGBI. I 1713 (F.R.G.); Verordnung fiber die Einreichung
quotal zusammengefapter Monatsausweise nach dem Gesetz fiber das Kreditwesen
(Monatsausweisverordnung), 1985 BGBI. 1 2501 (F.R.G.). See Bauer, Regulation in Ger-
many, supra note 21, § 13.18, at 13-25 to 13-26.
109. KWG, supra note 20, 8 24; Reporting Regulation, supra note 108, § 8.
110. KWG, supra note 20, §§ 13-13(a); Reporting Regulation, supra note 108, §§ 3
& 4.
111. KWG, supra note 20, §8 15, 16; Reporting Regulation, supra note 108, §§ 6 &
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disposition of more than 10% of the equity of another com-
pany or certain changes in the amount of such equity invest-
ments;112 balance sheets;113 compliance statements with regard
to capital and liquidity (Principles I, Ia, II and III);1 4 cross-bor-
der money transfers;1 5 foreign lending;"' and, statements listing
outstanding loans exceeding DM 1,000,000 (DM 3,000,000 be-
ginning July 1, 1993). 1
In order to maintain compliance with the banking laws, the
Supervisory Authority may, among other things, at any time re-
quest information from, and conduct examinations of, a bank." 8
Since the Supervisory Authority does not have a staff of examin-
ers, it will normally delegate the responsibility of inspection to
auditing firms or the German Federal Bank."' The Supervisory
Authority may call and attend meetings of a bank's supervisory
board and order or prohibit certain actions in cases where a
bank's liable capital or liquidity is insufficient or where the bank
might not be able to perform its obligations to creditors. 20 It
may close a bank or withdraw a bank's banking license.' 2'
If one compares the regulation and supervision of German
banks with the regulation and supervision of banks in the
United States, one must conclude that the German system
avoids some of the difficulties of the United States system. The
following are some of the more obvious advantages of the Ger-
man system:
7.
112. KWG, supra note 20, § 24(1), No. 3 & § 15(1), sentence 1, No. 9; Reporting
Regulation, supra note 108, § 8.
113. KWG, supra note 20, § 25 (monthly information) & § 26 (annual financial in-
formation); Reporting Regulation, supra note 108, § 12.
114. See Letter from the Supervisory Authority of Dec. 29, 1992 (No. 17-4216-1/91);
Bauer, Regulation in Germany, supra note 21, § 13.18, at 13-25. See also supra notes
78-84 and accompanying text.
115. See Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz (Foreign Trade Law), 1961 BGBI. I 481, as
amended (F.R.G); Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung (Foreign Trade Regulation), 1986 BGB1.
I 2671 (F.R.G), as amended, §§ 59-69.
116. Verordnung Ober Angaben zu den Krediten an aushindische Kreditnehmer
nach dem Gesetz fiber das Kreditwesen (Landerrisikoverordnung) (Country Risk Regula-
tion), 1985 BGBl. I 2497 (F.R.G.).
117. KWG, supra note 20, § 14(1) (requiring quarterly reports on outstanding loans
of DM one million or more) was amended by the KWG, 1993 Amendments to increase
the amount to DM three million. This increase becomes effective on July 1, 1993. KWG,
1993 Amendments, supra note 20, art. 9. See Reporting Regulation, supra note 108, § 5.
118. KWG, supra note 20, §§ 44, 44a.
119. See Bauer, Regulation in Germany, supra note 21, § 13.21, at 13-29.
120. KWG, supra note 20, §§ 45, 46.
121. KWG, supra note 20, §§ 46-51, 54-60.
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(1) In Germany, there are no regulators with overlapping ju-
risdictions; neither the power of state and federal regulators122
nor the powers of various 'federal agencies are duplicative. The
authorities of the Supervisory Agency and the German Federal
Bank are clearly defined.
(2) There are substantially fewer laws and regulations in
Germany because Germany does not impose on banks the nu-
merous restrictions on activities under which United States
banks have to live and, consequently, the German regulators do
not have to engage in the cumbersome procedures of granting
exemptions from such prohibitions.
(3) Germany has avoided the problems created by the
United States system of a governmental deposit insurance. 123
VII. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF UNIVERSAL BANKING
The advantages of the universal banking system are well
known and need not be discussed here in detail. There are three
significant advantages: (1) economies of scope and scale if a
bank can offer and sell all financial services, such as consumer
credit and life insurance; (2) decrease in cost of supervision and
regulation; and, (3) alternative revenue sources for the bank and
a corresponding reduction of economic risk.124 In spite of these
indisputable advantages, the universal banking system as it ex-
ists in Germany today is far from being undisputed. Among a
variety of issues being discussed, 25 three dangers arising from
the universal banking system should be specifically mentioned:
(1) dangers to the bank itself and consequently to its depositors;
(2) the possible abuse of information by the bank; and (3) dan-
gers to competition. None of these three concerns involves all
three elements of the German universal banking system - the
122. See Michael Gruson, Foreign Banks Are No Longer Welcome in the United
States, 10 No. 23 BANKING POL'y REP. 5 (Dec. 2, 1991); Michael Gruson, Neue
Beschrdinkungen flir auslaindische Banken in den USA, 46 ZEITSCHRr FOR WIRT-
SCHAFTS- UND BANKRECHT 1757, 1759 (1992).
123. See generally PETER J. WALLISON, BACK FROM THE BRINK (1990).
124. See Hans E. Bflschgen, The Universal Banking System in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, 2 J. Cohip. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 1, 4-10 (1979); Eberhard Martini, Hat
das deutsche Universalbanksystem Zukunft, 39 OSTERREICHISCHES BANK-ARCHiv 615
(1991).
125. See Hans-Jacob Krilmmel, German Universal Banking Scrutinized, 4 J. BANK-
ING & FIN. 33, 36-46 (1980); Theodor Baums, Should Banks own Industrial Firms? 5
REVUE DE LA BANQUE/BANK-EN FINANCIEWEZEN 249, 253-54 (1992); GEORGE J. BENSTON,
THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT BANKING 179-214 (1990).
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ability of a bank to engage in commercial and investment bank-
ing under the same roof, the ability of banks to own shares of
non-banking corporations, and the right of commercial enter-
prises to own banks.
A. Dangers to the Bank and its Depositors
Dangers to the bank itself and, consequently, to its deposi-
tors are obviously connected with the first aspect of the German
universal banking system, commercial and investment banking
under one roof.126 But they can also arise from the second as-
pect, the permanent holding of shares of non-banking corpora-
tions: 12 7 First, shares held by the bank must be considered to be
illiquid assets that, in case of a "run" when the bank needs
money, probably have to be sold below their real value. Further-
more, the possible loss of value of the shares held by the bank
can lead to a diminution of the bank's assets and, consequently,
of the security of deposits. Besides, if a corporation runs into
difficulties and the shares are held by a bank, then the bank
may be tempted to grant risky credits to that corporation in or-
der to secure the value of its shares.1 28Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether these dangers really
justify a general prohibition of shareholding, dealing in securi-
ties, and underwriting by commercial banks as is the case in the
United States under the Glass-Steagall Act.1 29 In Germany the
problem is solved by the following: (1) restricting the amount of
illiquid assets of the bank, which must not exceed in the aggre-
gate the liable capital of the bank;130 (2) limiting each significant
investment to 15% of the bank's liable capital and all significant
investments to 60% of the bank's liable capital; 31 (3) restricting
the amounts of a bank's large loans (i.e., loans extended to or
investments made in any one borrower or consolidated group of
borrowers that, in the aggregate, exceed 15% of a bank's liable
capital) to eight times the bank's liable capital and each single
126. See More, Note, supra note 3, at 444-49.
127. See THEODOR BAUMS, VERBINDUNGEN VON BANKEN UND UNTERNEHMEN IM
AMERIKANISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSREcHT 51 (1992).
128. Michael Gruson, Non-Banking Activities of Foreign Banks Operating in the
United States, in REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS, UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL
§ 9.01, at 9-3 (Michael Gruson and Ralph Reisner eds., 1991).
129. See BAUMS, supra note 127, at 12, 27.
130. KWG, supra note 20, § 12. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
131. KWG, 1993 Amendments, supra note 20, § 12(5). See supra notes 28-36 and
accompanying text.
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large loan to 50% of a bank's liable capital; 13 2 and, (4) requiring
prompt reports to the Supervisory Authority and the German
Federal Bank of the acquisition or disposition of an investment
in another company in excess of 10% of the equity of such com-
pany and of changes in such investments if such change involves
more than 5% of the equity of such company. 133 This system is
flexible because it is based on the capitalization of the bank and
it is generally considered to be sufficient. Even after the two re-
cent bank collapses - Herstatt Bank in 1974 and Schroeder,
Muenchmeyer, Hengst & Co. in 1983 - the German legislature
and the German banking regulators did not deem it necessary to
change the whole system. The Supervisory Authority, however,
tightened existing supervisory regulations.134
B. The Possible Abuse of Information
A second argument that could be raised against the German
universal banking system concerns the possible abuse of infor-
mation.-This danger concerns primarily the first element of that
system - the ability to practice commercial and investment
banking under one roof. For example, a bank could be tempted
to use information it obtained in the course of a credit relation-
ship in order to buy or sell shares of the corporation concerned.
But an abuse of information can also happen in connection with
the second aspect - the ability of banks to be permanent share-
holders of non-banking corporations. For example, a bank could
hand over information to one of its non-banking subsidiaries
that it has acquired as creditor of a competing corporation.135
Furthermore, information the bank receives as shareholder
could, in the case of a crisis of the corporation concerned, be
used by the bank in order to react faster than other competing
creditors.
It must be admitted that the dangers of an abuse of infor-
mation can probably not be excluded completely by institutional
precautions such as physical and personal separation of commer-
cial and investment banking - "Chinese Walls.' 36 Neverthe-
less, the abusing bank may incur civil liabilities and, much more
132. KWG, supra note 20, § 13. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
133. KWG, supra note 20, § 24(1) & (3). See KWG, supra note 20, § 15(1)(9).
134. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
135. See BAUMS, supra note 127, at 71.
136. See BAUMS, supra note 127, at 72.
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importantly, risk its reputation if it abuses confidential informa-
tion. It seems that this risk by itself is quite effective in discour-
aging banks from abusing information. The danger that a bank
may abuse inside information is not unique for universal banks.
It also exists in the case of the United States banking system,137
and the regulatory and legislative approaches to dealing with
this problem are the same in both systems.
C. Dangers to Competition
The third argument that could be raised against the univer-
sal banking system relates to the possible dangers to competi-
tion caused by that system. These dangers become relevant only
in connection with the second aspect of universal banking - the
ability of banks to be permanent shareholders of non-banking
corporations. It is in this context that the discussion about the
pros and cons of the universal banking system has become par-
ticularly controversial in Germany. Thus, the Commission
Against Monopolies, an independent panel of experts that has
only advisory powers, has repeatedly proposed to restrict the
amount of shares that a bank is allowed to hold to 5% of the
total amount of shares of a corporation. 18
In fact, one could think of several situations where banks as
shareholders of non-banking corporations might be tempted to
apply practices that obstruct free competition. For example, the
bank could discriminate against competitors of its non-banking
corporation by offering its corporation more favorable credit
conditions."" It could try to conclude "tie-in" agreements with
its customers in order to oblige them to enter into business rela-
137. See Larry L. Varn, The Multi-Service Securities Firm and the Chinese Wall:
A New Look in the Light of the Federal Securities Code, 63 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1984);
Leo Herzel & Dale E. Coiling, The Chinese Wall and Conflict of Interest in Banks, 34
Bus. LAW 73 (1978); Ralph F. Huck, The Fatal Lure of the "Impermeable Chinese
Wall", 94 BANKING L.J. 100 (1977); Carlos E. Mandez-Pehate, The Bank "Chinese
Wall": Resolving and Contending with Conflicts of Duties, 93 BANKING L.J. 674 (1976);
Martin Lipton & Robert B. Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict Problems
of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 459 (1975); Martin E. Lybecker, Regulation of
Bank Trust Department Investment Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 977 (1973); Edward S. Her-
man & Carl F. Safanda, The Commercial Bank Trust Department and the "Wall", 14
B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REv. 21 (1972).
138. See Mehr Wettbewerb ist maglich, in Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten
1973/1975 296 (2d ed. 1977); Monopolkommission, Sondergutachten 18, Zusam-
menschlupvorhaben der Daimler-Benz AG mit der Messerschmitt-Bblkow-Blohm
GmbH, 145 (1st ed. 1989).
139. See Gruson, supra note 128.
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tions only with its corporation and not with the competitors of
that corporation.140 The bank could also be tempted to practice
"favoritism," by offering the customers of its corporation more
favorable conditions than the customers of competing corpora-
tions can get. Furthermore, it could try to prevent its corpora-
tion from entering into business relationships with other banks
or investment banks. Finally, the situation could arise where a
bank holds shares of corporations competing with each other
and thus might be tempted to use its influence in order to re-
duce competition between these corporations. Those dangers
seem to be even more relevant if one takes into consideration
that the influence German banks have as shareholders is com-
plemented by the voting power conferred to them by the voting
proxies they exercise on behalf of their customers.""
Under German law, these problems are dealt with by the
application of general competition law and especially the anti-
trust law, not by the banking law. While, for example, a special
statute in the United States prohibits banks from entering into
tie-in agreements, 42 such specific regulations do not exist in
Germany. But this does not mean that the more general ap-
proach of German law must necessarily be less effective. In seri-
ous cases of abuse, the German Civil Code permits courts to de-
clare an agreement void if it is contrary to public policy.1 43 One
can also argue that the general provisions of German law enable
the authorities to react with the necessary flexibility in order to
strike a reasonable balance between the interests concerned, i.e.,
to maintain free competition, on the one hand, and to have
banks that are strong enough to deserve confidence and to com-
pete internationally on the other. In this context, the possible
hazards of the German universal banking system must be seen
in connection with the advantages of such a system; it enables
banks to diversify and thus to respond flexibly to changing eco-
nomic144nomic situations. T
140. See BAUMS, supra note 127, at 67.
141. See Theodor Baums, Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the
Banks, 40 AM. J. CoMP. L. 503 (1992).
142. Bank Holding Company Amendment § 106(b) (1970) (current version at 12
U.S.C. § 1972 (1992)).
143. Btirgerliches Gesetzbuch [Civil Code] BGB § 138 (F.R.G.).
144. Martini, supra note 124, at 619.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The German government is presently working on legal re-
forms with the intention to make Germany one of the central
markets for financial services in a common European market.
This, together with the birth of a single EEC-wide banking mar-
ket on January 1, 1993, will create for banks in Germany a new,
far more competitive environment. It would seem that a univer-
sal banking system is most suitable to master the challenges fol-
lowing from structural changes brought by internationalization,
globalization, financial innovations, and changes in customer
needs. On the other hand, there is the need for the protection of
the depositors of the bank and the safety of the banking system
and its functions. Only a banking system that balances the op-
portunities of a bank to diversify risks and to have income from
different sources with effective, comprehensive, and consolidated
banking supervision will be the banking system of the future.
The banking system in Germany has a chance to meet this test.
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